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Introduction
On June 8-9, 2016, the Coastal Response Research Center (CRRC) 1 and Gulf of Mexico Disaster Response
Center (DRC) co-sponsored a National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Regional
Preparedness Training (NRPT) Workshop at the DRC’s facility in Mobile, AL. The workshop, titled
“Natural Disaster Causing Technology Disasters in Mobile Bay Area”, focused on preparedness, planning,
and improving response to an oil spill occurring during a natural disaster (e.g., flooding from a tropical
storm) and explored the roles and responsibilities under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90).
Thirty participants (Appendix A) represented federal, state and local agencies, industry, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
The workshop was the second of three in the NRPT series to provide a focused training to enhance Gulf
of Mexico regional preparedness across NOAA line offices and among key state, federal, and other
stakeholder partners. The overall goal of the NRPT workshops was to better understand human and
natural resources at risk, the roles and responsibilities of different response agencies, and the science
that drives decision-making during a coastal emergency. The first workshop, held at the Flower Garden
Banks National Marine Sanctuary Office in Galveston, TX on May 25-26, 2016, focused on preparedness,
planning, and improvement of response to a potential oil spill that threatened the sanctuary,
particularly dispersant use and in-situ burning, while developing the framework for an Environmental
Tradeoff Analysis to evaluate response options. The third workshop, held in St. Petersburg, FL on June
28-30, 2016, focused on risk communications during a major oil spill.
Nancy Kinner (CRRC Co-Director) and Charlie Henry (DRC Director) provided the welcome and
introductions for the Mobile Bay workshop. Charlie Henry provided background information about the
NRPT workshops and their goals. The goals of the Mobile Bay workshop were to increase awareness,
understanding, and coordination among participating stakeholder groups and agencies during response
and recovery to natural disasters that result in widespread impacts to industry, commerce,
communities, and natural resources in the Mississippi and Alabama coastal zone.
Objectives of the Mobile Bay workshop were to:
• Bring together a diverse group representing agencies and stakeholders who may be impacted by
or involved in response to Natural disasters triggering technological disasters (NaTech); and
• Increase regional preparedness by identifying potential strategies for improved response,
enhanced resilience, and quicker recovery when NaTech events occur.
NaTech events may result in a complicated response due to widespread impacts to industry, commerce,
business, residents, and natural resources in the coastal zone. Additionally, the response may be further
complicated as response actions occur under multiple enabling legislative authorities at the same time –
namely, the Stafford Act (due to the natural disaster) and OPA 90 (due to the oil spill).

1

A list of acronyms is provided on Page 1 of this report.
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The workshop consisted of presentations, a forum to answer participant questions, and breakout
sessions. Presentation topics included: primers on federal disaster response legislation and spill
regulations, case studies of responses under the Stafford Act and OPA 90, and an overview of the Mobile
Bay area.
The breakout sessions included discussions of: roles and challenges for different stakeholder groups and
for given NaTech scenarios, additional spill response challenges due to the natural disaster, and
improvements in preparation and planning for NaTech.
The agenda for the workshop can be found in Appendix B.

Presentations
A summary of each presentation from the workshop is provided in this section. Slides for the
presentations are located in Appendix C. Most summaries were written by the presenters.

National Incident Management System and National Response
Framework
CDR Kevin Lynn (U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Gulf Strike Team) provided an overview on the National
Response Framework (NRF) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) as part of a refresher
and primer on federal disaster response legislation. During times of emergency, the U.S. is guided in its
response protocol by two overarching concepts, among many other levels of federal, state and local
doctrine. The NRF meets the president’s national preparedness objective and outlines how the federal
government will provide coordinated support to the other echelons of government. NIMS meets the
president’s objective for managing domestic incidents and establishes the concepts for incident
command and multi-agency coordination. This presentation provided an overview of concepts,
implementation, key functions, and relationships to the public, private sector, NGOs and all levels of
government. Major coordination actions of the federal government authorized by the Stafford Act,
associated Emergency Support Functions, and initiating triggers were presented along with a high level
overview of the Incident Command System (ICS) and concept of Unified Command (UC). The
presentation concluded with a discussion on how the NRF and NIMS are interdependent on each other
and emphasized the critical need for partnership and preparedness.

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
Ashley Leflore (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)) provided a brief overview of the history of
disaster legislation and how the Stafford Act became the authority by which the federal government
supports local and state efforts in disasters. This presentation served as the second part of the refresher
and primer on federal disaster response legislation.
The Stafford Act consists of seven sections (i.e., titles): (1) congressional findings, (2) preparedness and
mitigation, (3) administrative information, (4) types of federal assistance programs, (5) types of
emergency assistance programs, (6) emergency preparedness, and (7) miscellaneous rules regarding
assistance.

Coastal Response Research Center
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Three types of federal assistance were discussed:
1. A major disaster declaration occurs after an event has caused damage,
2. An emergency declaration is an occasion in which federal assistance is required to save lives,
protect property, or lessen a threat (in the latter case, it can be declared prior to the event),
3. Fire Management Assistance includes grants, equipment, personnel, and supplies made
available to supplement community efforts when a fire on public property, forest, or grasslands
threatens a major disaster declaration.
The intent of the Stafford Act can be described in two core principles: (1) it is a supplement to state and
local efforts, which means it is not an entitlement, and has to be approved among various parameters as
a third level of assistance; and (2) the legislation can only be triggered by the request of the governor in
the state impacted. The governor must submit an official request that includes: the severity of the
event, what assistance is requested, what local/state resources and funds are committed to the effort,
and what priorities are for assistance.
The assistance provided includes:
• Individual assistance (e.g., lodging, help with rent, disaster counseling),
• Public assistance (e.g., debris removal, restoring the use of public roads and utilities),
• Hazard mitigation, which is a grant program to fund measures that reduce risk (e.g., buying out
properties, elevating homes).
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) administers most authorities under the Stafford
Act and all assistance is financed through the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF). The DRF is a congressional
appropriation with funding that is not limited to fiscal years and does not expire.
More information on the Stafford Act can be found in the Media Library on the FEMA website 2.

Federal Spill Regulations Refresher and Primer
CDR Christopher Cederholm (USCG Sector Mobile) and Leo Francendese (U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (USEPA)) provided an overview to the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution
Contingency Plan (NCP), OPA 90, the Clean Water Act (CWA), and the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).
A number of federal authorities are responsible for governing oil spills in the U.S. The main actors in the
governing system are a combination of state, federal and international authorities. They are collectively
responsible for creating and implementing legislation to prevent oil spills and handling the decisions and
procedures that follow in the aftermath.
The NCP established the response system the federal government follows in the event of an oil spill
and/or release of hazardous materials into the environment. The NCP was a response by U.S. policy
makers to the SS Torrey Canyon oil tanker spill in 1967 off the coast of England. It has since been
amended by CWA, OPA 90, and CERCLA.

2

http://www.fema.gov/media-library
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The purpose of the NCP is to provide the organizational structure and procedures for preparing for and
responding to discharges of oil and releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants. The
four general priorities include:
1. Giving safety and human health top priority during every response action,
2. Stabilizing the situation in order to prevent the event from worsening,
3. Using all necessary containment and removal tactics in a coordinated manner to ensure timely,
effective response,
4. Taking action to minimize further environmental impact from additional discharges.
The NCP established the Regional Response Teams (RRTs) and their roles and responsibilities which
include coordinating preparedness, planning, and response at the regional level. Each RRT consists of a
team made up of federal agency representatives, as well as state and local government representatives
and an incident-specific team that are activated in a response.
The NCP also defines the objective, authority, and scope of the National Contingency Plan, Regional
Contingency Plans (RCPs), and Area Contingency Plans (ACPs) (which may also include Geographic
Response Plans (GRPs)).
Agency jurisdictions as the Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) include:
• USCG ‐ discharges of oil; release of hazardous substances, pollutants and/or contaminants into
the environment in the coastal zone,
• USEPA ‐ discharges of oil; release of hazardous substances, pollutants and/or contaminants into
the environment inland,
• Department of Defense ‐ discharges of oil; release of hazardous substances, pollutants and/or
contaminants into the environment from military-operated facilities, installations, munitions
and/or military vessels,
• Department of Energy ‐ discharges of oil; release of hazardous substances, pollutants and/or
contaminants into the environment from DOE facilities or non‐DOD radiation sources.
Notice of discharge and releases are made to the National Response Center (NRC) which is the federal
government’s communications center. Reports to the NRC activate the NCP and the federal
government’s response capabilities.
The CWA is the primary federal law in the U.S. governing water pollution. Its objective is to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters by preventing point and
nonpoint pollution sources, providing assistance to publicly owned treatment works for the
improvement of wastewater treatment, and maintaining the integrity of wetlands. It is administered by
USEPA, in coordination with state governments.
OPA 90 increased the role and dimensions of the NCP by establishing more robust planning and
response systems to prevent and mitigate spills in marine environments. It is the primary legislation that
governs oil spills in the U.S. The establishment of OPA 90 substantiated the federal government’s role in
responding to oil spill cleanups. OPA 90 made amendments to the already existing CWA to provide three
options to the delegated authorities through the president. The options include:
Coastal Response Research Center
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•
•
•

Conducting immediate cleanup by federal authorities,
Monitoring the response of the responsible party,
Commandeering the cleanup activities of the responsible party.

Hence, OPA 90 gives the federal government the authority to determine the level of cleanup required.
OPA 90 was established as a result of the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 and it created the Oil Spill Liability
Trust Fund (OSLTF) using the primary source of revenue from a per-barrel tax on the oil industry. The
responsible party (RP) is liable for costs and damages. OPA 90 also establishes a certain dollar amount
above which an RP is not liable for paying for the cost of a spill; this value was updated in December
2015. The National Pollution Funds Center (NPFC) has a billing and collection program to recover costs
expended from the OSLTF. Included in the use of the funds is the response costs incurred by the USCG
and USEPA, as well as the payments to Federal, State and Tribal Natural Resource Trustees (Trustees) to
conduct Natural Resource Damage Assessments (NRDAs) and restorations. It also allows the USCG to
designate Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) contracts to Oil Spill Removal Organizations (OSROs).
CERCLA, administered by the USEPA, was enacted in 1980 and it: (1) established prohibitions and
requirements concerning closed and abandoned hazardous waste sites, (2) provided for liability of
persons responsible for releases of hazardous waste at these sites, and (3) established a trust fund to
provide for cleanup when no responsible party could be identified.
As part of the RRT 4 RCP, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the USCG and USEPA
delineates the inland and coastal zone geographical boundaries establishing responsibility for the predesignation of the FOSC. The USEPA provides the pre-designated FOSC for pollution response in inland
zones and the USCG Captain of the Port (COTP) is the pre-designated FOSC for pollution in the coastal
zone.
The USCG and the USEPA use the ICS management system called, which is a part of the NIMS, which
provides a framework for responses, including oil spill responses.
The EPA On-Scene Coordinator website 3 provides updates on spills and releases under OPA 90 and
CERLA where USEPA is the FOSC. The NOAA Incident News 4 website provides information about spills
where NOAA ORR provides scientific support for the incident response.

3
4

https://www.epaosc.org/
https://incidentnews.noaa.gov/
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Case Study: Stafford Act Response
Kim Albins (NOAA Marine Debris Program) provided a brief overview of an historic flooding event which
occurred in South Alabama in April 2014 and resulted in a declaration of the Stafford Act. Severe
weather and over 20 inches of rainfall resulted in record flooding. In anticipation of ongoing severe
weather, Alabama’s governor declared a State of Emergency to initiate a state-level response to
supplement local efforts. Local municipalities, including fire and police departments, and county and
state responders led initial search and rescue operations. At the state’s request, President Obama made
a Major Disaster Declaration on May 2 making federal disaster aid available. $1.9 million was allocated
for debris removal on a cost-sharing basis. Storm impacts were varied and included one confirmed
fatality, road closures, sinkholes, flooded homes and debris in waterways. After Baldwin County rejected
the state’s request to lead waterway debris removal operations, the Alabama Department of
Conservation and Natural Resources (ADCNR) took the lead as an applicant to FEMA with the USACE
providing technical assistance under a mission assignment. In order to be eligible for Stafford Act
funding, debris must be storm-related, a threat to navigation safety, and/or impacting threatened and
endangered species habitat. Waterway debris removal operations occurred during September-October
2014.

Case Study: OPA 90 Response
Adam Davis (NOAA ORR Emergency Response Division (ERD)) provided a case study presentation on an
oil spill response in the Mobile River which occurred in 2011. The spill originated from a bulk oil storage
facility during a tank-to-tank transfer on Blakely Island and resulted in the discharge of approximately
500 barrels of oil to the river. This spill was limited to localized impacts, such as a brief river closure, and
did not involve a complex or prolonged cleanup. The oil in the river was quickly contained with boom. A
number of deep draft vessels and smaller vessels, barges, and a dredge were oiled and required
decontamination.
The case study was chosen to demonstrate the roles, responsibilities and authorities of agencies
responding under a typical OPA 90 response with an identified and UC response structure. The RP
initiated their response plan, notified the NRC, and mobilized their OSRO. The OSRO and RP secured the
source, contained the spill, and mobilized cleanup crews. The USCG received notice from the NRC,
contacted the RP and ordered an overflight for assessment. The USCG mobilized to the incident in order
to set up UC. Then, in concert with NOAA, they began the larger assessment of impacts and resources at
risk.
The complications in the response included an initial confusion as to the product type (i.e., crude vs.
refined) and its associated fate in the environment. Weather hindered operations on the first day which
resulted in an increased amount of oiled debris (and increased cleanup costs). The river was closed for
several days.
The RP funded the response under OPA 90/CWA Limits of Liability. The USCG accessed the OSLTF with
reimbursement from the RP. There were third party claims for the oiled vessels and loss of revenue due
to the river closure.

Coastal Response Research Center
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Mobile River Delta and Basin Overview
Tom Smith (USACE) provided a brief overview of the Mobile River Delta and Basin relative to its natural
features, salient industrial elements, transportation and wastewater infrastructure and adjoining
population centers.
Salient natural features included:
• Five rivers (Mobile, Tensaw, Blakeley, Spanish, and Apalachee) form the second largest delta,
the fourth largest watershed based on drainage, and the fifth largest based on area in the U.S.,
• There is 415 sq. mi bay area with average depth of 10 ft. and over 135 mi of shoreline and it was
designated as one of 28 National Estuary Programs in 1995,
• It is one of the most diverse ecosystems in the U.S. with three types of wetland habitats,
extensive seagrasses, 200+ species of fish, major shellfish communities, and 300+ species of
birds and reptiles,
• The Mobile-Tombigbee River basin is one of 51 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS)
recognized Strategic Habitat Units in Alabama where the agency is managing and restoring
populations of rare fishes, mussels, snails, and crayfishes,
• It is only one of two places on earth where the phenomenon of “Jubilees” occur (i.e.,
crustaceans and demersal fish can be found in shallow coastal water in large numbers),
• The Alabama seafood industry contribute approximately $461 million in revenue annually and
10,000 jobs.
Salient industrial elements:
• The Port of Mobile is the twelfth busiest in the U.S. with a reported 54 million tons of
commerce,
• Commercial and military ship builders include Austal with an ongoing $3.5 billion littoral combat
ship contract,
• There is a growing aerospace industry including large scale passenger plane manufacturing and
repair.
Transportation and wastewater infrastructure:
• Interstate 10 and U.S. Highway 90 both span the area from east to west and pass through
tunnels beneath the Mobile River. Additionally, Interstate 10 is elevated approximately 20 ft.
above the Bay,
• Annually, 6.2 tons of material passes through the Port of Mobile by rail,
• The Mobile Area Water and Sewer System, has two wastewater treatment plants located at
McDuffie Island and Three Mile Creek. The McDuffie Island plant processes 28 million gallons
per day (MGD) and is 15 ft. above sea level. Three Mile Creek plant processes 12.8 MGD and the
site elevation ranges 10 to 30 ft. above sea level.

Coastal Response Research Center

Page 9

Natural Disaster Causing Technology Disasters in Mobile Bay Area

Adjoining population centers (i.e., communities within proximity to the Port of Mobile and bound by
Interstate 10 to the sound and Three Mile Creek to the north):
• The “Down the Bay” area is approximately 11 ft. above sea level with mostly slab on grade
construction,
• The “Downtown Historic District” is approximately 13 ft. above sea level with step-up raised first
floor elevations,
• The “Downtown and LODA” areas are approximately 13 ft. above sea level with primarily
nonresidential first floor space,
• “De Tonti Square” is approximately 10 ft. above sea level with step-up raised first floor
elevations,
• “Orange Grove, Renaissance” is approximately 10 ft. above sea level with slab on grade
construction,
• “Plateau (Africatown)” on average, 20 ft. above sea level with slab on grade construction,
• There are two Hospitals along the banks of Three Mile Creek with parking lots and drives at 9 ft.
above sea level with nonresidential first floor and 700 beds.

Introduction to Natural Hazards Triggering Technological Disasters
Nancy Kinner provided an overview of NaTech (e.g., the 1 million gallon Murphy Oil spill (St. Bernard
Parish, LA) caused when Hurricane Katrina displaced an oil storage tank). Much of the research and
planning and preparedness for NaTech has been done in the European Union and Japan, but more
recently within the U.S. (e.g., the June 2016 FEMA-led “Cascadia Rising” exercise that centered on an
earthquake and tsunami triggering technological disasters). The key components in emergency response
are often no different for NaTech events than natural disasters, but it is the need to conduct multiple,
concurrent responses that makes preparation and planning essential. Integrated Risk Management is
essential for NaTech planning: to identify multiple risks and discuss how to address synchronous events.
The presentation described several ongoing NaTech related activities: (1) the European Commission’s
NaTech Accident Database; (2) the electronic regional risk atlas (ERRA) being pioneered in central
Europe; (3) the “bow-tie” approach to integrated risk management; and (4) the extended NaTech risk
analysis framework. The latter project, a collaboration between European and Japanese scientists, uses
models of natural disasters to predict the susceptibility of industrial facilities (i.e., fragility) to damage.
This helps identify key infrastructure to upgrade and protect in order to avoid or mitigate technological
disasters. A second part of the project uses a “comprehensive economy-wide simulation model”
(computable general equilibrium (CGE) model) and existing local input – output tables of goods and
services to minimize supply chain disruption resulting from NaTech. These latter two approaches
(fragility and CGE modeling) could be used in the U.S., especially for storm-prone ports (e.g., New
Orleans, LA; Mobile, AL) to plan/prepare for NaTech events.

Natural Resource Trustee Perspective on Impacts and Challenges:
Natural Resource Damage Assessment and Restoration
Peter Tuttle (USFWS) and Kevin Kirsch (NOAA ORR Assessment and Restoration Division (ARD)) provided
an overview on NRDAs and restoration.
Coastal Response Research Center
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Under CERCLA and OPA 90, the parties responsible for a release of hazardous substances or an oil spill
are financially responsible for a variety of costs, including among other things, the cost to clean up the
release and the cost to compensate the public and the environment for natural resources and resource
services lost or diminished by the release and associated response activities. Federal, State, and Tribal
Trustees, acting on behalf of the public, are responsible for leading NRDA efforts to assess the effects of
the oil spill and associated response actions to natural resources and to restore injured resources to the
condition in which they would have been, but for the spill (i.e., baseline).
In simple terms, NRDA may be defined as a compensatory (not a punitive) process used by the Trustees
to determine the nature and extent of injury to trust resources caused by an oil spill or the release of a
hazardous substance for the purpose of restoring the natural resources. NRDA compensates the public
and the environment for these injuries and losses. Federal Trustees are designated by the president.
State Trustees are designated by the governor. Injury is defined as any adverse change in the condition
of resources or resource services caused by exposure to the released material or action taken to
respond to the release. Natural resources include land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water,
drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging to, managed by, or held in trust by, the
U.S., States, Tribes, or foreign governments. Trustees are mandated to use monies recovered through
the NRDA process to restore, rehabilitate, replace, or acquire the equivalent of the natural resources
injured by the release. To meet this mandate, Trustees seek to restore injured resources and services to
baseline. The public must also be compensated for interim losses (the losses that occur during the time
it takes the resources to recover to baseline). RPs are responsible the cost of assessing injuries to natural
resources and can participate in the NRDA. The public is able to participate in restoration planning.

Disaster Scenario Overview
Adam Davis provided context to a potential disaster scenario with publicly available Geographic
Information System (GIS) tools including the Environmental Response Management Application
(ERMA®) 5 and the Coastal Flood Exposure Mapper 6 as well as images of oil spills from Hurricane Katrina
and its associated storm surge.
CRRC further refined the potential scenario to:
• Date: September 7, 2017,
• Slow-moving tropical storm hits the Mobile Bay area causing 4-5 ft. of flooding in the downtown
area resulting in the causeway bridge closure (the tunnels remain open),
• An oil tanker, with crew on-board and a 100 million gallon capacity, is partially submerged in the
Port of Mobile adjacent to the Convention Center.
A spill scenario in 2017 potentially includes new cruise line industry operations in the Port of Mobile. It is
important to note that forecasts of a tropic storm may not be a cause for evacuation of the port and the
subsequent flooding from a slow-moving storm may not always be predicted.

5
6

https://erma.noaa.gov
https://coast.noaa.gov/floodexposure
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Breakout Sessions
Workshop participants were divided into three or four groups for breakout sessions. The first breakout
session consisted of four different groups based on the types of organizations the participants
represented. [N.B., There were two groups that represented federal and state agencies.] The second
and third breakout session had three parallel groups (i.e., each group discussed the same topic). An
effort was made by CRRC to have a distribution of participant expertise in all groups. A list of the
breakout groups is located in Appendix D. Each group had a leader to help facilitate the discussion and a
notetaker equipped with a laptop and projector to capture discussion points. Each group completed a
predetermined workshop template (Appendix E).
The summary and distillation of key points from the breakout sessions are presented below. Breakout
session notes are located in Appendix F.

Session I
The first breakout session was in the afternoon on the first day of the workshop. The session identified
stakeholder needs and concerns. Groups were divided into the following categories:
• Federal and state agencies,
• National Estuarine Research Reserve System (NERRS), NGOs, academia, education and outreach,
• Port and local stakeholders.
Participants discussed the following questions for the NaTech event in the Mobile Bay area:
1. What would your role(s) be?
2. What do you foresee being the greatest challenge for you in your current role(s)?
3. What do you want others to understand better about your roles?
4. What other organizations in this category (e.g., federal and state agencies) have not been
mentioned? What are their roles?
5. From your perspective, who are potential stakeholder groups affected by or concerned with the
oil spill and/or the storm-related disaster? What is their greatest concern? How can they be
better involved and/or informed? What do they need to know?

Coastal Response Research Center
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Federal and State Agencies
Federal agency participation included NOAA, USACE, USCG, USEPA, and USFWS. State agency
participation included ADCNR and Alabama Department of Environmental Management (ADEM).
The role(s) of the federal agencies during a NaTech response include:
• NOAA: Provides weather forecasts, physical damage assessments and NRDAs, and scientific
support to the FOSC; assists with marine debris and in the safe navigation in ports with NOAA
charts and surveying for debris in waterways (except for Corps channels); and is a Trustee,
• USACE: If Stafford Act is enacted, supports FEMA,
• USCG: Serves as FOSC for the incident in the coastal zone, conducts search and rescue, and
determines whether to open or close port areas (i.e., COTP’s authority),
• USEPA: Provides OSC support to the USCG,
• USFWS: Provides support to the IC on how to minimize impacts to resources (e.g., threatened
and endangered (T&E) species, habitat), and is a Trustee.
The role from the state government agencies during a NaTech response include:
• ADCNR: Leads FEMA requests for support, involved in search and rescue, and is a Trustee
• ADEM: Administers major environmental laws (e.g., CWA, Clean Air Act), and is a Trustee
A challenge from the state agency perspective is the State’s willingness to cover the cost share
requirement of the Stafford Act. There is also a perception issue because the public does not understand
the limitations of the agencies’ authorities and funding. If the Stafford Act is invoked, it is important to
understand and communicate how the public’s involvement or volunteer efforts impact whether the
activity is eligible for reimbursement from FEMA.
A challenge within the federal agencies is the competing demands of personnel and time during a
NaTech response. Further, the USCG must prioritize missions (e.g., search and rescue over
environmental protection) in the response efforts. Communication and coordination within and
between organizations, as well as the dissemination of information to the public is a challenge.
Other federal entities that would be involved in a NaTech response include:
• FEMA,
• Department of Homeland Security,
• National Guard,
• NOAA National Weather Service,
• U.S. Public Health Service,
• National Parks Services,
• Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Other state agencies that would be involved in a NaTech response include:
• AL Department of Transportation,
• AL Law Enforcement Agency,

•

Geologic Survey of Alabama.
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NERRS, NGOs, Academia, Education and Outreach
Participants from MS-AL Sea Grant, the Gulf of Mexico Research Initiative (GoMRI), AL Sierra Club and
Grand Bay NERR comprised the “NERRS, NGOs, Academia, Education and Outreach” breakout group.
Sea Grant does not have a mandatory role in responding to a NaTech event, however, the organization
would serve as a liaison for NOAA to assess the needs of communities. NERRS facilities and equipment
can be provided for responders and response efforts. NGOs (e.g., AL Sierra Club) can coordinate
volunteers and evaluate and advocate for change in legislation to address future NaTech events.
Academia can collect data and information. All of these organizations have networks and the ability to
engage with the community. The organizations can all reach out to stakeholders and share information,
field questions and correct misinformation.
Challenges include: accessing information from the UC in a timely manner in order to share with
stakeholders, reporting and responding to unforeseen concerns, as well as creating and understanding
their roles in response efforts.
In general, these types of organizations seek to aid the response effort by making information more
accessible to the public, or providing preparedness training for local communities.
Other organizations that could be involved in a NaTech response include:
• Faith-based organizations,
• Other NGOs,
• Civic clubs,
• Neighborhood associations.

Port and Local Stakeholders
Participants representing the Alabama State Port Authority (ASPA), BAE Systems, and the City of Mobile
comprised the “Port and Local Stakeholders” breakout group. The Harbormaster from the ASPA is
responsible for ensuring the operations of the port, the safety of navigation, and the security of the
harbor, which includes determining which vessels move in and out of the port and at what times. In the
event of flooding, the City of Mobile would be involved regarding impacts to the city’s stormwater. An
employee from BAE Systems, representing private industry, discussed the company’s role if a spill
originated from or impacted their facility. If that happened, BAE would oversee remediation and
reporting.
Challenges for the port and local stakeholders include: accessing the information from the UC to the
industry, not including local responders in the response effort when the federal government is involved
(where other responders do not understand the area), and there is limited response equipment.
Documentation, inspections, and reimbursement involving the federal government were also viewed as
challenges. The greatest challenge would be to resume port operations after a NaTech event due to its
impact on the economy. Not only is there an impact of a closed port to the local economy with
employees out of work, but the reach of the port is global where manufacturing in other areas would
quickly shut down without shipments of inventory transiting from the port.
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Other local agencies and stakeholder that would be involved in a NaTech response include:
• Local industry (e.g., tank farms, oil facilities, bar pilots, tug captains),
• Local business (e.g., Convention Center),
• Hotels,
• Cruise ships,
• Downstream users (e.g., just-in-time manufacturing),
• Police and fire department,
• Mobile and Baldwin County health departments,
• Local utilities (e.g., power, wastewater, water),
• Schools,
• Elected and appointed officials.

Challenges and Stakeholder Concerns
There were challenges that were identified in the breakout groups that applied to or were related across
categories, including:
• Limited funding,
• Apparent slowness of response due to
lag time in permitting (e.g., T&E
• Limited personnel and equipment,
species),
• Timely communication (with public,
• Injection of politics into the response,
internal within the response, to
impacted industries other than RP, from
• Financial loss while the port is closed,
UC),
• Federal response using non-local
personnel, equipment, etc.,
• Federal agency logistical support,
• Interagency coordination,
• Established protocols for access,
• Personnel turn-over,
• Tapping into NGOs, NERRS, and
academic networks to improve
• Prioritization of missions,
response and prepare (e.g.,
• Managing social media/other media,
communication to stakeholders,
• Combatting public perception,
training of local communities).
• Entities lacking a response mentality,
•

Responders caught in the middle (i.e.,
public demand for information vs.
reluctance to release information),

The overall concern for all stakeholders is knowing what is happening and when everything will return to
“normal”. Table 1 summarizes the stakeholder concerns identified in Breakout Session I.
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Table 1. Summary list of stakeholder concerns for Breakout Session I for a NaTech event in the Mobile
Bay area
Stakeholder
Concern
Public
• When can I get back home?
• How do I get reimbursed?
• Health and safety, including mental health/stress concerns
• Who can help me gain access to services?
• Loss of livelihood
• Financial losses
• Seafood safety
Local business
• Loss of livelihood
• When can I re-open?
• Financial losses
• Mental health/stress
• Loss of personnel
Tourism (e.g., cruise lines)
• Mental health/stress
• Financial loss
• Public perception
• Environmental impacts
NGOs (e.g., Sierra Club, Bay
• Environmental impacts
Keeper)
• Mission-based concerns
Seafood Industry/Commercial
• Environmental impacts
Fishing
• Financial loss
• When can I fish again?
• Mental health/stress
Recreational Fishing
• When can I fish again?
Elected officials
• Public perception
• Impact on electability
• How is my constituency affected?
• How is my infrastructure impacted?
Industry (e.g., transportation,
• When is navigation safe?
manufacturing)
• What are priorities for vessel movement?
• When can we go back to normal operation?
• Financial losses
Trustees
• Environmental impacts
Tribes
• When can I get back home?
•
•

Coastal Response Research Center
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Subsistence users

NERRS, NPS
Local schools

Hospitals
Local utilities (e.g., power,
sewer, water)

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Who can help me gain access to services?
Loss of livelihood
Financial losses
Cultural impacts
Seafood safety
When can I get back home?
Health and safety, including mental health/stress
How do I get reimbursed?
Who can help me gain access to services?
Loss of livelihood
Financial losses
Food scarcity and seafood safety
Environmental impacts
Health and safety
When can students return?
Limited resources, personnel
Public access
High demand during period of limited resources and staffing
Facility repairs
Financial losses
When can facilities operate again?
Communication

Session II: Planning and Preparedness
The second breakout session was in the morning of the second day of the workshop. Participants
revisited the challenges and concerns from the first session and addressed the following questions:
1. What would likely work “as planned” (i.e., if there was only an oil spill)?
2. What would be the special challenges in responding to the oil spill as a result of the flooding and
storm-related issues?
3. What is missing in the existing plans/preparedness? What should be added or changed?
4. How well prepared are we to predict what will happen/impacts and respond? What can we do
to better predict impacts?
5. What are the possible “unknowns”? How do we deal with uncertainty?
6. What best practices would help us to respond better?
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In the event of a spill, an NRC notification would be issued and the USCG COTP and Harbormaster would
be notified. The USCG, as FOSC, would be the federal lead in the response effort with the following
efforts:
• Initiate search and rescue (if needed),
• Notify state, county, local agencies, etc.,
• Shut down river traffic, businesses, and facilities,
• Set up security zones on water and land,
• Initiate Hazardous Materials (HazMat) response,
• Mitigate and stabilize sources,
• Activate the ACP including vessel/facility response plan(s) and GRPs as part of response efforts
and identify areas that need immediate protection,
• Request NOAA trajectories,
• Set up Incident Command Post.
Challenges that may arise in spill response as a result of flooding and storm-related issues include:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Mobilizing assets due to access and impacted transportation routes (e.g., causeway closed),
Containing the spill due to flooding,
Storm conditions may impact the oil spill trajectory,
Increase in oiled debris from contaminated land (instead of storm debris),
Storm impacts the response efforts,
Difficult to establish a perimeter and secure the scene.

There is a prioritization to conduct search and rescue before an environmental response. There may be
displaced people and public health concerns. There may be reduced spill response personnel due to the
storm response efforts. Communications within and between organizations may be impacted. A loss of
power would be a constraint.
In terms of the predicting impacts, the ability to predict flooding exists, tide and current data is
immediately available, the spill trajectory analysis is developed rapidly by NOAA ORR, and storm
forecasting is provided by NOAA National Weather Service (NWS). There is an understanding of how
water moves around Mobile Bay and the city as a result of sea level rise and storm surge work that could
be tied into response efforts. In prioritizing a response, GRPs show sensitive areas (e.g., booming
strategies, T&E species locations). By conducting Area Committee Meetings before an incident occurs,
responders can be made aware of the sources of information and existing models. The use of remote
sensing could better predict impacts, however, they may have limited use during a storm.
The “unknowns” from the scenario included:
• What is the weather forecast? Will it escalate impacts?
• Are there other threats escalating (e.g., wastewater treatment plant, neighboring industries
impacted by flooding)?
• Are there human casualties from the natural disaster?
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•

What OSROs are available?

In general, outreach is not included in existing preparedness plans. In order to prepare for NaTech
events and response, contingency plans could include:
• Ability for the public to report oil sighting (e.g., to submit photographs in the case of oil
spreading),
• Use of the county social media,
• Incorporation of public perception into the messaging (instead of combating it).
In addition, plans could also include a process for security to protect the public due to flooding and
contamination on land.
In order to better respond, it is important to practice NaTech responses (e.g., trainings, drills, tabletop
exercises). Use of contingency plans (i.e., ACPs, GRPs, facility and vessels plans) during these practices
can help identify ways to refine/improve the plans.

Session III: Next Steps
The last breakout session was in the afternoon of the second day of the workshop and participants
addressed the following questions:
• What steps need to be taken to improve preparation and planning (as discussed in breakout
session II) to address this kind of scenario?
• Who should be involved in implementing these steps (e.g., partnerships, teams)?
• What are the impediments, if any (e.g., funding)?
• How long would it take to implement the steps (e.g., months, years, continual)?
After the participants in the breakout groups identified these steps, they prioritized them in terms of
importance. The top responses are summarized below.
Two of the three groups identified increased participation at the USCG Area Committee meetings and
training events is the most important step in planning for a NaTech event and response. Increased
participation would improve the content of the ACP, as well as build relationships and increase
understanding of the various roles and responsibilities during response. Participates should include
USCG, NOAA, USEPA, ADEM, Sea Grant, NERRS, Mobile Bay National Estuary Program, NGOs, industry,
elected officials, and state and local agencies. Currently, the participation in and frequency of these
meetings are low. Challenges include scheduling conflicts, time commitment issues, and general
complacency. Personnel turnover results in out of date email contact lists. The participation in Area
Committee meetings and training must be a continual effort.
All three groups highly ranked the frequency of tabletop exercises and trainings for preparedness
planning. Organizations include: USACE, FEMA, U.S. Army, USCG, Trustee agencies, NGOs, public health
agencies, and state and local government. One group included media participation in training exercises
as part of building relationships and improving messaging. Tabletop exercises that use GRPs and online
tools would provide the opportunity to update contingency plans. In addition to funding, challenges
include the lack of interest or engagement. These training exercises must be a continual effort.
Coastal Response Research Center
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One group suggested more equipment and training of the local police department in HazMat response
(e.g., mimic OSC equipment) in order to protect responders and improve communication. This would
include the local police department and city council. Once funding was secured, training could be
implemented in months, however, the training refresher would be on an annual basis.
One group identified the need for an internal and external process and procedure for developing and
releasing press releases, and for sharing information and data from the UC. An efficient process would
better improve the safety for stakeholders and the public, while allowing responders to focus on the
response. This would involve the UC including the Incident Management Team (IMT), members of the
Joint Information Center, and the environmental unit. This would require execution at different levels
within the USCG and there would need to be a willingness to address this throughout the organization.
The process and procedure could be developed within three months.
Another group suggested organizing public forums (e.g., town hall meetings) with communities to
educate them about what to expect during a NaTech response and use the opportunity to combat
misconceptions. Forums would include spokespeople from individual agencies, Local Emergency
Planning Committees (LEPC), and other members of the community.

Conclusions
The workshop was an opportunity to increase awareness, understanding, and coordination among
participating stakeholder groups and agencies involved in a NaTECH response. Unfortunately, NaTech
events will continue to occur. In addition to Hurricane Katrina, the weather conditions from Hurricane
Sandy (2012) caused: a diesel spill at the Motiva Refinery (Sewarren, NJ), a biodiesel spill at the Kinder
Morgan Terminal (Carteret, NJ), a fuel oil spill at the Phillips 66 Refinery (Linden, NJ), and other spills
which spread oil and hazardous materials in NY and NJ waterways and ports. The workshop was an
example of the importance of continual regional training to improve preparedness, planning and
response to potential oil spills that impact natural and human resources. Discussions among all of the
potential stakeholders prior to spills always improve the “climate” for response when an actual spill
occurs.
The workshop identified the need for:
• More continual and frequent Area Committee meetings and trainings with greater participation
among stakeholders to: update and improve the ACP and GRPs, better understand the roles and
responsibilities of responders, and build relationships,
• More training and equipment for local police departments for HazMat response,
• An internal and external process and procedure for developing and releasing press releases, and
sharing information and data from the UC, as well as a process to communicate with
communities so they know what to expect when an incident happens.
The challenge of communicating important information to the public and media in a timely manner was
highlighted throughout the workshop. The third workshop in the NRPT series, “Addressing Public
Concerns During Spill Response… Sorting Fact from Fiction During Response” held June 28-29, 2016 in St.

Coastal Response Research Center

Page 20

Natural Disaster Causing Technology Disasters in Mobile Bay Area

Petersburg, FL had the goal of improving responders’ knowledge of the current state-of-science of risk
communication during oil spills and their ability to communicate to the public about the response. The
challenges identified from the Mobile Bay workshop reported here were considered during the FL NRPT
workshop.
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NOAA’s Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)
Natural Disaster Causing Technology Disasters in Mobile Bay Area
June 8 - 9, 2016
NOAA’s Gulf of Mexico Disaster Response Center
Mobile, AL
Goal: Increase awareness, understanding and coordination among participating stakeholder groups and agencies
during response and recovery to natural disasters that result in widespread impacts to industry, commerce,
communities and natural resources in the Mississippi/Alabama coastal zone.
Objectives:
• Bring together a diverse group representing agencies and stakeholders who may be impacted by or
involved in response to natural disasters resulting in multiple impacts.
• Increase regional preparedness by identifying potential strategies for improved response, enhanced
resilience, and quicker recovery.
Wednesday, June 8
8:30 am

Welcome & Logistics
• Nancy Kinner, Coastal Response Research Center (CRRC)

8:40 am

Welcome, Background, Workshop Goals
• Charlie Henry, NOAA’s Gulf of Mexico Disaster Response Center

8:50 am

Participant Introductions

9:15 am

Response Case Studies: Stafford Act Response and OPA 90 Response
• Stafford Act Response – Kim Albins, NOAA Marine Debris Program
• OPA 90 Response – Adam Davis, NOAA

9:45 am

Federal Disaster Response Legislation Refresher and Primer
• National Incident Management System (NIMS) and National Response Framework – CDR
Lynn, USCG Gulf Strike Team
• Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act) –Ashley
Leflore, Emergency Management Planner, Army Corps of Engineers

10:15 am

BREAK

10:30 am

Federal Spill Regulations Refresher and Primer
• Clean Water Act, OPA 90 – CDR Cederholm, USCG Sector Mobile
• CERCLA – Leo Francendese, USEPA

11:00 am

Disaster Scenario Overview
• Adam Davis, NOAA Office of Response and Restoration (ORR)

11:15am

Participant Questions/Input

11:30-12:45

LUNCH (on your own)

12:45 pm

Response to Questions from earlier session

1:15 pm

Overview of Impacted Area
• Tom Smith, Army Corps of Engineers

1:35 pm

Summarize Impacts in Relation to Scenario Specifics – Adam Davis, NOAA ORR

1:45 pm

Charge to Breakout Groups - Nancy Kinner, CRRC

2:00 pm

Breakout Group Session I: Identifying Stakeholder Needs and Concerns
Breakout Groups by Category:
• Federal Agencies
• State/Local Agencies
• Industry
• NGOs/Academia
Questions to consider:
1. What are your roles?
2. In this scenario, what do you foresee being the greatest challenge for you in your current
roles?
3. What do you want others to understand better about your roles?
4. Are there other “players” that belong to this category (federal, state/local, industry, or
NGOs/academia) that have not been mentioned? What are their roles?
5. From your perspective, who are potential stakeholder groups affected by/concerned with
the oil spill and/or storm related disaster?
• What is their greatest concern?
• How can they be better involved and/or informed?
• What do they need to know?

3:30 pm

BREAK

3:45 pm

Group Reports

4:45 pm

Adjourn

Thursday, June 9
8:30 am

Recap & Recalibrate

8:45 am

Plenary Session: Introduction to Natural Hazards Triggering Technological Disasters (NaTECH)
• Nancy Kinner, CRRC

9:00 am

Panel: Natural Resource Trustee Perspective on Impacts and Challenges: Damage Assessment
and Restoration
• NOAA ARD
• USFWS
• ADCNR
• Grand Bay NERR

9:45 am

BREAK

10:00 am

Breakout Group Session II: Planning/Preparedness
For the scenario, revisit themes of challenges and concerns from Breakout Session I when
addressing the following questions:
1. What would likely work “as planned” (i.e., if there was only an oil spill)?
2. What would be the special challenges due to attendant flooding and storm related
issues?
3. What is missing in the existing plans/preparedness? What would we add or change?
4. How well prepared are we to predict and respond? What can we do to better predict
impacts?
5. What are the possible “unknowns”? How do we deal with uncertainty?
6. What best practices would help us to respond better?

11:30-12:45

LUNCH (on your own)

12:45 pm

Group Reports

1:30 pm

Breakout Group Session III: Next Steps:
1. What steps need to be taken to improve preparation and planning (as discussed in
breakout session II) to address this kind of scenario?
2. Who should be involved? Partnerships, Teams, etc.
3. Prioritize these steps (time table)
4. Identify/address impediments (e.g., funding)

3:00 pm

BREAK

3:15 pm

Group Reports

4:15 pm

Wrap-Up and Path Forward

4:30 pm

Adjourn
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Breakout Group 1
Weds June 8, 2016
Group A (Federal/State)
Room : Communications

Group B (Federal/State)
Room: Command/Control

Peter Tuttle

Shannon Holbrook

Will Underwood

Diane Palmore

Phillip Hinesley

Tom Smith

Susan Rees

Jeff Medlin

Charlie Henry (Group Lead)

Nancy Kinner (Group Lead)

Katherine Pierson

Kevin Lynn

Ashley Leflore

Leo Francendese

Amy Gohres (Recorder)

Becky Allee (Recorder)

Christopher Cederholm

Daniel Dunn

Group C (NERRS and NGOs)
Room: Breakout Three

Group D (Port/Local Stakeholders)
Room: Training (across hall)

Carol Adams-Davis

Brian Austin

LaDon Swann (Group Lead)

Bob Harris

Larissa Graham (Recorder)

Whitney Hauer (Recorder)

Ayesha Gray

Terry Gilbreath (Group Lead)

Chuck Wilson

Denise Brown
Tommy Robinson
Vincent Phillips

Breakout Groups 2 and 3
Thursday June 9, 2016
Group A
Room : Communications

Group B
Room: Command/Control

Charlie Henry, LEAD

Whitney Hauer, LEAD

Amy Gohres (Recorder)

Becky Allee (Recorder)

Peter Tuttle

Patric Harper

Carol Adams-Davis

Bob Harris

Brian Austin

Ashley Leflore (AM only)

Tom Smith

Daniel Dunn

Diane Palmore

Leo Francendese

Group C
Room: Training (across hall)
LaDon Swann, LEAD
Larissa Graham (Recorder)
Mike Shelton
Terry Gilbreath
Katherine Pierson
Denise Brown
Will Underwood
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NOAA’s Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)
Natural Disaster Causing Technology Disasters in Mobile Bay Area
June 8, 2:00 PM
Breakout Group Session I: Identifying Stakeholder Needs and Concerns
Group A. Federal/State Agencies
Group C. Federal/State Agencies
Group C. NERRS and NGOs
Group C. Port/Local Stakeholders
1. What are your roles?
2.

In this scenario, what do you foresee being the greatest challenge for you in your current roles?

3. What do you want others to understand better about your roles?
4. What other NERRS and NGOs have not been mentioned? What are their roles?
5. From your perspective, who are potential stakeholder groups affected by/concerned with the oil
spill and/or storm related disaster?
•

What is their greatest concern?

•

How can they be better involved and/or informed?

•

What do they need to know?

Group A. Page 1
NOAA’s Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)
Natural Disaster Causing Technology Disasters in Mobile Bay Area
June 9, 10:00 AM
Breakout Group Session II: Planning/Preparedness
Group A
For the scenario, revisit themes of challenges and concerns from Breakout Session I when addressing the
following questions:
1. What would likely work “as planned” (i.e., if there was only an oil spill)?
2. What would be the special challenges in responding to the oil spill as a result of the flooding and
storm-related issues?
3. What is missing in the existing plans/preparedness? What could we add or change?

4. How well prepared are we to predict impacts and respond? What can we do to better predict
impacts?

5. What are the possible “unknowns”? How do we deal with uncertainty?

6. What best practices would help us to respond better?

Group A. Page 2
1:30 pm
Breakout Group Session III: Next Steps
Group A
What steps need to be taken to
improve preparation and
planning (as discussed in
breakout session II) to address
this kind of scenario?

Who should be involved in
implementing the steps above
(e.g., partnerships, teams)?

Identify any impediments (e.g.,
funding)

Prioritize these steps and
estimate how long it would
take to implement the steps
(e.g., months, years, continual)
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Page 1 Group A. Federal/State Agencies
NOAA’s Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)
Natural Disaster Causing Technology Disasters in Mobile Bay Area
June 8, 2:00 PM
Breakout Group Session I: Identifying Stakeholder Needs and Concerns
Attendees: Charlie Henry (NOAA, DRC), Amy Gohres (NOAA, DRC), Ashley Leflore (U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, Mobile District), Will Underwood (ADCNR, State Lands Division, Coastal Section), Peter Tuttle
(U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, NRDA Office), CDR Chris Cederholm (U.S. Coast Guard, Sector Mobile)
Group A. Federal/State Agencies
1. What are your roles?
ADCNR:
• State Lands has submerged lands trustee status. Wildlife and Freshwater Fisheries (WFF) has
trustee status over fish, birds, mammals. Marine Resources Division (MRD) has trustee status
over marine resources.
• Engineering Section leads FEMA requests for support on recovery side.
• State Lands Division (SLD) officers involved in SAR ops. State also manages lands that could be
impacted (National Estuarine Research Reserves (NERRS)).
USFWS:
• During response (oil/hurricane), serve as resource within IC
o Provide local information to IC and different sections on wildlife resources, sensitive
habitat, T&E.
o Within IC, often takes lead role on wildlife operations section. Injured/impaired
wildlife recover and rehabilitation.
• Within environmental contaminant program, have knowledge about contaminant
effects/toxicology.
• From regulatory standpoint, TE involved so there will be an emergency consultation.
o Incident responders can serve as liaison to home office.
o Emergency consultations are consulting on effects of response action itself (not
pollution itself). Within IC, serve more as a liaison.
• Within Mobile Bay area, Bon Secour National Wildlife Refuge (NWR) on Ft. Morgan peninsula.
o Land owner management role for NWR. If Natural Resource Damage Assessment
(NRDA) action. Distinct funding streams between OPA funds and NRDA funds.
USCG:
• CPT of Port (COTP) owns closing/opening port areas. Broad federal authority. Restart
commerce and marine transportation.
• Search and Rescue (SAR) mission coordinator (SMC)
• Federal On-Scene Coordinator (FOSC) coordinates during spills/releases/etc.
• Officer in Charge of Marine Inspections (OCMI), US Flag Fleet, licensing (may not be used in
this scenario)
• Federal Maritime Security Coordinator – coordinates things on the water security wise
• Manpower-Surge resources – can have thousands of individuals
USACE:
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•
•
•

Don’t have to wait to fight floods or check civil works projects – check on USACE managed
areas and infrastructure right away
May receive FEMA mission assignments. Have staff at coordination center waiting on green
light (for ESF-3 primarily)
Manages emergency permitting, permitting for work in wetlands, Section 404. Go through
paperwork for entry into private property.

NOAA:
• National Weather Service - Weather forecasts
• Assessments: Physical damage assessments (NGS aircraft, satellites)
• Assisting and opening ports and safe navigation (NOAA charts) – surveying for debris in
waterways (except Corps channels)
• Assist in response to oil and chemical pollution (ESF-10), marine debris
• NRDA, including consultations for protected species (marine)
• New EMA pre-scripted mission assignment for NOAA Coastal Science Coordinator to work
with JFO to support response and long term recovery
2. In this scenario, what do you foresee being the greatest challenge for you in your current roles?
ADCNR
• Small agency, limited resources
• Internal communications, turnover within agency – reinforce recognition of roles
USFWS
• During hurricane/oil spill, competing demands of personnel and time
o Chemical companies, Walmart, gas stations, etc. all impacted at the same time that
would require attention
• Service facilities – Bon Secour NWR and how they were impacted
• No availability of Stafford Act funds (b/c federal agency)
USCG
•
•
•
•
•

Prioritization of missions
Interagency coordination
Public affairs/governmental affairs pressures
Communications
Note: May be operating in multiple different areas

USACE
• Agency is impact at the same time they are responding. Do damage assessments on civil
works projects and also assist on other projects/mission assignments.
• How to access USACE downtown facility or COOPS location after event
• Impacts to contractors who would do the work. Do we need to share resources with other
districts?
NOAA
• Maintaining communications
• Logistical support for staff from other locations – no place for them to stay after event
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3. What do you want others to understand better about your roles?
ADCNR
• Public have better understanding of roles of individual divisions within agency (ADCNR)
• With FEMA response, if volunteers remove debris it may not be eligible for reimbursement
from FEMA. Desire for public involvement but may not be a place for it during Stafford
response.
USFWS
•
•
•
•
USCG
•
•

Within USFWS/DOI have depth and a lot of resources
DOI has roles under each ESF
Nationwide and can bring in highly qualified people at short notice
A lot of expertise
Staff-wise organization is transient, per person productivity might be less than other agencies
because of new personnel
Upside is that this adds to staff capabilities

USACE
• Locals do not have an understanding of what USACE’s role is or that USACE only does what
FEMA directs them to do (during emergency response). People may think USACE has a say in
determining eligibility.
NOAA
• More than just office that regulates fisheries (snapper season)
4. What other federal and state agencies have not been mentioned? What are their roles?
Federal
• FEMA
• NPS (FL and MS)
• National Guard, Civil Support Team
• Public Health Service, CDC
• USEPA
State
• ADEM
• AL Law Enforcement Agency (ALEA)
• ALDOT
• Geologic Survey of Alabama (GSA) – mapping, state trustee
County Health agencies
• Mobile County Health Dept
• AL Dept of Public Health, Baldwin County
5. From your perspective, who are potential stakeholder groups affected by/concerned with the oil
spill and/or storm related disaster?
NGOs (Sierra Club, Audubon)
Seafood Industry/Commercial Fishermen
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Recreational fisherman
Industry (multiple: transportation, manufacturing, retail, etc.)
Various levels of government (elected officials, city mayors)
Public in general, people who lost homes
• What is their greatest concern?
Just want to know. When will it be back to normal.
NGOs (Sierra Club, Audubon) - Dependent on NGO mission-set (environmental social justice, wildlife,
etc.)
Seafood Industry/Commercial Fishermen – safety, closures, public perception (marketability), long
term effects, safe refuge for vessels (so doesn’t become debris), access to fuel/docks/ice, debris
Recreational fisherman – snapper season, safety, fishery closures, ramp closures or used for response
Industry (multiple: transportation, manufacturing, retail, etc.) – Just in time delivery, finances/profits
Various levels of government (elected officials, city mayors) – Public perception, how fast will we
recover (tax revenue)
Public in general, people who lost homes – insurance rates, getting back to normal life (electricity,
fuel, food), toxicity/health concerns from spill, identifying contractors for repairs
• How can they be better involved and/or informed?
Transparency, including multi-media transparency (use multiple sources for information)
Better public affairs and information management within response
Expectation management, don’t overpromise
• What do they need to know?
We need to answer the questions they are going to have
Don’t tell them what they need to know
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NOAA’s Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)
June 8, 2:00 PM
Breakout Group Session I: Identifying Stakeholder Needs and Concerns
Group B. Federal/State Agencies
1. What are your roles?
USCG – serving as federal OSC for incident in coastal zone; fyi -- ESF 10  oil and hazmat function
under NRF
Army Corps – once Stafford Act enacted, FEMA brings in Corps for ice distribution, debris removal,
and evaluating roofs; incidental contact as needed, billable organization; if someone has a specific
expertise that is needed, can pull that person in to help with issue; may be tasked to assess
information once acquired; ESF 3  public works and engineering; perform damage assessments for
structures and utilities; Corps is invited in, does not have a specific mission
EPA – EPA would work w/ (support) USCG as lead; Stafford Act lead is “less significant” (more about
which tool is most appropriate at the time) b/c each agency has mission assignment; evaluate
problems and send out notification(s) to initiate appropriate response (e.g., notify the gas company of
a leak)
FWS – dealing with environmental resources; advise IC (or command structure) on how to handle
resources (living, habitat); minimize impacts
ADEM – sitting in on joint science meeting, environmental trustee for state; document all activities to
preserve info (who did what, environmental impacts); no authority to do anything; “secretary on the
road”; documenting to make sure things get done; have no fund and no contracting authority; much
less delegating authority from state; would likely forward IAP to someone else seeking concurrence,
not someone at scene but in a managerial or political position (e.g., head of ADEM); skill depends on
how well ADEM staff keep management informed; have responsibility for sampling (e.g., after DWH,
told to go collect water – figure out why later)
Jointly – carve out tasks among agencies as information grows
2. In this scenario, what do you foresee being the greatest challenge for you in your current roles?
In general – State’s willingness to cover cost share portion of Stafford Act requirement
USCG – Managing social media; combatting public’s perception of what we’re doing
Army Corps – getting in own way, Corps or other government agencies; many entities within a
government organization don’t have response mentality
EPA – dissemination of information – accurate and timely; restricted by higher ups; minor issue can
become very big issue; different perspectives
FWS – media perception; mission not to see effect on humans – negative view; perceived as not
caring about people; process takes time, can’t happen overnight
ADEM – public interface huge challenge; most people do not understand limitations of authority;
public expects action
3. What do you want others to understand better about your roles?
USCG – public perspective how they can integrate into response; when is it appropriate?
Army Corps – Understanding role, especially non-federal entities; role limited by authorities; public
needs to understand role has limitations
EPA – perception that emergency response is insular group that cuts out participation; really
opposite; in age of expanding participation but still someone has to be in charge
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FWS – that process takes time; requires evaluation
ADEM – understand limitations
4. What other state and federal agencies have not been mentioned? What are their roles?
Dept of Public Health – local or state; trusted by public; good at communicating hazard; NCP requires
OSC ensures safety to public and consultation w/ public health departments and checking Agency for
Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
Alabama Power – not a state agency BUT has own fund for response; authorized by governor to
expend funds in response
ACDNR
Fire/Police Departments – secure scene; road closures; evacuations
ALDOT – road closures; road/bridge inspections; open response fund (their own fund) for isolated
incidents
Alabama Emergency Management Agency – general emergency coordination
NOAA/NWS
IMAAC (Interagency Modeling and atmospheric assessment center) – issues plume model bulletins
Homeland Security – because of impact to major transportation and refineries
FEMA – funding and writing checks
National Guard – Civilian Support Team
5. From your perspective, who are potential stakeholder groups affected by/concerned with the oil
spill and/or storm related disaster?
Public
Transportation sector
Elected officials
NGOs/Conservation groups – e.g., River Keeper
Community groups – Africatown has a group
FWS
NOAA Fisheries and Ocean Service – as trustees for resources; integrated into response structure
Chamber of Commerce
Local industry – chemical primarily
Local businesses
Tribes
Tourism providers
Watermen – people making living from or recreating on the water
Subsistence fishers
Cruise lines
• What is their greatest concern?
Public – safe, home, money 1) safety, health, getting back in homes, back in routine, going back to
work, power, internet; 2) NOAA radio, media communication; 3) what they can expect, what impact
will be, timeline from a trusted entity, where to go for help
Transportation sector – 1) money (includes economy), when back to normal operations; 2) Maritime
Transportation system recovery groups; 3) when is navigation safe, what are priorities for movement
(who moves first)
Elected officials – 1) public perception, public health, how constituency is affected, infrastructure; 2)
get involved in planning and preparedness stages, understand roles/responsibilities and limitations; 3)
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impacts of all aspects of their area (e.g., transportation), need to understand response mechanisms,
need to understand how NRF process works go to governor  request to president
NGOs/Conservation groups – e.g., River Keeper
Community groups – Africatown has a group
FWS – as trustees for resources; integrated into response structure; 1) impacts to resources; 2)
involvement in planning and response
NOAA Fisheries and Ocean Service – as trustees for resources; integrated into response structure
(same as FWS)
Chamber of Commerce
Local industry – chemical primarily
Local businesses
Tribes
Tourism providers
Watermen – people making living from or recreating on the water
Subsistence fishers
Cruise lines
•

How can they be better involved and/or informed?

•

What do they need to know?
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NOAA’s Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)
Natural Disaster Causing Technology Disasters in Mobile Bay Area
June 8, 2:00 PM
Breakout Group Session I: Identifying Stakeholder Needs and Concerns
Group C. Academia, Outreach/Education, and NGOs
1. What are your roles?
2.

No mandatory role but would interface with NOAA based on partnerships/efforts from past
disasters (Sea Grant)
Share information & correct misinformation from stakeholders (seafood, file claims, etc) Compile questions but also answer questions; distill science; conduct seminars/workshops;
serve as a liaison for NOAA to assess needs of communities (Sea Grant)
Provide facility & equipment available for responders & response efforts (NERR)
Coordinate efforts & assist own communities on personal time (NERR/DMR)
Field questions & provide information (NERR)
Answer questions; share information in a timely matter; correct misinformation; provide
environmental educational programs; host experts to answer questions (Sierra Club)
Evaluate & advocate for change in legislation, etc., for future spills/disasters (Sierra Club)
Share lessons learned from past experiences (All)
Reach out to national network for assistance (All)
Engage communities (All)
Work together to be more effective and more resourceful (All)
Collect information (Academia)
Coordinate volunteers (NGOs)

In this scenario, what do you foresee being the greatest challenge for you in your current roles?
-

Getting access to information from unified command in a timely manner so it can be shared
with stakeholders
Facility and equipment might be impacted by disaster (NERR)
Reporting and responding to unforeseen concerns & develop solutions
Understanding & creating a role in response efforts

3. What do you want others to understand better about your roles?
-

Searching for answers & truth and want to share that information
Help response efforts – answer questions, ease concerns, lessen burden
More assessable to public – can serve as leader to help share information
Provide preparedness/preventative training for local communities

4. What other groups (academia, outreach/education, NGOs) have not been mentioned? What are
their roles?
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Other groups:
- Faith-based organizations
- NGOs
- Cities, counties, states
- Elected and appointed officials
- Civic clubs
- Neighborhood associations
- Schools
Roles:
- Trust established
- Relationships developed
- In proximity/neighbors with communities
Ideas (for future efforts):
- Have similar event as today for communities
- Need to exercises to practice response efforts (with community involvement)
5. From your perspective, who are potential stakeholder groups affected by/concerned with the oil
spill and/or storm related disaster?
-

Communities (Africatown, Pritchard, bait shrimping community)
Waterfront residents
Waterfront businesses – ports, harbors
Fishing community
Battleship

•

What is their greatest concern?

-

Long-term impacts
Loss of livelihood
Contamination
Flooding
Impacts that won’t recover
Environmental health
Public health

•

How can they be better involved and/or informed?

-

(We can: ) Develop relationships with those that would have information during response
(We can help: ) Develop monitoring programs in place (air, water, etc.) to collect data
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•

What do they need to know?

-

Effects/impacts to all concerns listed above
How questions will be answered
Compensation
Who is responsible
Future prevention/preparedness
Recovery timeline

Page 1 Group D. Port/Local Stakeholders
NOAA’s Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)
Natural Disaster Causing Technology Disasters in Mobile Bay Area
June 8, 2:00 PM
Breakout Group Session I: Identifying Stakeholder Needs and Concerns
Group D. Port/Local Stakeholders
1. What are your roles?
- Harbor master – which vessels need to go, when to get moving
- Env. Director AL State Port Authority – If release, 2nd call after fire dept. once fire dept. has
stabilized the situation, then over to the env. Director. One challenge is to ID the RP. Then
convince them to come out bc its their responsibility
o Storm checklist, try to get haz materials out ahead of the storm
o Person owning haz mat also wants out of harms way
-

2.

Env. Group, City of Mobile – only involved impacts to city stormwater, storm drain within the
city limits. City will have to a follow up report how there was impact to rivers, creeks. Would
have to monitor.
Env. Supervisor, industry (BAE) – reporting locally for a facility, report to USCG, oversee
remediation, reports (spills from facility or spills impacting the facility)

In this scenario, what do you foresee being the greatest challenge for you in your current roles?
- From the industry side, trying to make sure that you are part of what is going on with the Fed
response. Be a part of the command center is possible to listen in
- Feds tend to take over the response and overwhelm everything and forget the local
responders (Feds have BOA for major companies, but there are local responders). RP does not
stay in charge for very long.
- Politics!
- Industry might be peripherally damaged, but not principal
- Port, all the customers want to be up and operational ASAP but are pressured. Get channel
surveyed
- Shipyard has similar issues as the Port
- Federal response hears from local
- Fed bring in out of state personnel, not familiar with the area
- MTSRU is supposed to help the USGS, but need to understand the area
- Tough to understand the financial implication that the port, shipyard or city is incurring
- Responders become scarce in the example of a big hurricane. Bring in responders from out of
town. Responders nearby will want to hold back people resources bc they will all be affected
- Limited response equipment
- “Fed money comes with Fed problems”, new animal dealing with FEMA, need to be prepared
for a new set of challenge than paying yourself and asking for reimbursement from FEMA.
E.g., inspector/inspections and documentation
- Fed/state/local sealing off an area. Need to established protocol for how to get into the Port.
From a security perspective, trying to get in to do the job. How do get people into a secured
area. E.g., get an electrician into the port
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3. What do you want others to understand better about your roles?
- Pressure to get the Port back in business
- Reach of the port throughout the state is huge. E.g., shipment of paper by rail to Kansas,
paper from Brazil, big impact to industry
- Employees out of work, need to work to support families etc.
- Manufacturing without a lot of inventory, shutdown happens quickly
- Bringing to another Port does not solve the problem
- For the city, FEMA may have support but city knows where to go, what to unclog, clear
streets, etc. city has done it before
4. What other port/local stakeholders have not been mentioned? What are their roles?
- Tank farms, oil facilities
- Bar pilots (can only work 12 hr within 24 hr period), tugs – limited personnel
- Tugs captains also have limitations - staff
- Roles of coast guard plays to reopen channel and ACE – survey of waterway, aids to
navigation (mark the channel)
- Other industries along the river, e.g., Austal usually have 4-5 vessels in the water. Unmanned.
- Cruise ships – 2000 people on ship, vehicles at cruise terminal
- Downstream users, just in time delivery (manufacturers don’t stockpile)
- Local business, responders working out of Convention Center
- Hotels, putting up responders
- Local utilities (power, sewage, water)
- Hospitals
5. From your perspective, who are potential stakeholder groups affected by/concerned with the oil
spill and/or storm related disaster?
- Commercial and recreational fishing
- Fishing vessels became vessels of opportunity
- Tourism, cruise ships
- Gulf Island Nat Seashore (NPS)
- Local business
- Local schools
- Resource agencies (wetlands, habitat, wildlife)
- Environmental groups, bay keepers, Sierra Club, etc.
- Other municipalities and counties
A copy and paste from #4:
- Tank farms, oil facilities
- Bar pilots (can only work 12 hr within 24 hr period), tugs – limited personnel
- Tugs captains also have limitations - staff
- Roles of coast guard plays to reopen channel and ACE – survey of waterway, aids to
navigation (mark the channel)
- Other industries along the river, e.g., Austal usually have 4-5 vessels in the water. Unmanned.
- Cruise ships – 2000 people on ship, vehicles at cruise terminal
- Downstream users, just in time delivery (manufacturers don’t stockpile)
- Local business, responders working out of Convention Center
- Hotels, putting up responders
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-

Local utilities (power, sewage, water)
Hospitals

•
-

What is their greatest concern?
When they can get back to normal function?
Injury, loss of personnel
Getting information out (find out when street are open, etc)
From Katrina, lessons learned about communication

•
-

How can they be better involved and/or informed?
Communication: storm radios, local antennae
Have an emergency plan (work, family)
Know who to contact (with the city, the port, a business)
More involved in emergency response exercise/preparedness

•
-

What do they need to know?
Access, e.g., to home or business, when will roads be cleared, etc.
When will utilities be restored to get back home or business
Where to go for help. E.g., medical, food, gas, ice
Accounting for all members of the family and employees
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NOAA’s Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)
Natural Disaster Causing Technology Disasters in Mobile Bay Area
June 9, 10:00 AM
Breakout Group Session II: Planning/Preparedness
Group A
Attendees: Carol Adams (Sierra Club), Brian Austin (BAE Systems), Charlie Henry (NOAA), Diane Palmore
(ADEM), Tom Smith (USACE), Pete Tuttle (USFWS)
For the scenario, revisit themes of challenges and concerns from Breakout Session I when addressing the
following questions:
1. What would likely work “as planned” (i.e., if there was only an oil spill)?
• Communications and notification systems (NRC notification)
• Harbor master, head of port has been notified. Would have knowledge of what
equipment/vessels are in the area.
• Oil spill control specialists deploy on behalf of company (Responsible Party - RP), will have
contracts with local spill cleanup Oil Spill Response Organizations (OSROs)
• U.S. Coast Guard will act as federal lead (Federal On-Scene Coordinator - FOSC)
• Area Contingency Plan (ACP) in place and will be activated – Identifies areas that need
immediate protection
• Vessel has response plan in place regarding source control – they (captain, crew) are the
most competent people to manage the source control
2. What would be the special challenges in responding to the oil spill as a result of the flooding and
storm-related issues?
• Transportation routes needed to implement ACP may be impacted by weather
o Slows response
o Getting equipment launched (vessels, aircraft) and accessing water
• Poor visibility
• Oil continues to spill throughout event
• Deployed equipment could be affected by weather
• Booms may be ineffective in weather conditions
• Vessel may not be safe for people to stay on.
o Vessel may be compromised – captain needs to do damage assessment and
update as needed.
o Crew may have to be evacuated
o Could have fatalities or serious injuries
• People responsible for managing oil spill response are already engaged in preparing
facility for approaching storm, managing Search and Rescue, etc.
o Have to check and ground truth all reported issues – pulled in many different
directions.
o All agencies are already busy.
• If evacuating because of high water, could create issues. Flooding has potential to
transport oil unless oil is contained within the river.
• Sensitive areas north and south of spill location could be impacted
• High winds could transport oil north into the delta (dependent on rotation), natural
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•
•
•

dispersion can increase impact
Public needs to be notified to avoid the area
Have not been a lot of spills in area. Plans have not been exercised recently.
Complacency.
Flammability/fire could complicate response

3. What is missing in the existing plans/preparedness? What could we add or change?
• If oil is spreading, need to have a number for public to call if they are sighting oil (more
eyes help). Perhaps use photographs instead of verbal reports.
• Use of social media by counties, use to advantage in response. Use photographs.
• Incorporate public perception into message rather than combating it
4. How well prepared are we to predict impacts and respond? What can we do to better predict
impacts?
• Complacency. No large spills in areas in long time.
• Protection strategies, contacts in ACP are used. Other sections are not.
• Have Area Committee Meetings (before and incident) to plan for how to respond
• NOAA leads trajectory analysis using information called in – weather forecasters will be
busy because of storm forecasting
• USACE modeling expertise could be used to improve forecasts (in development)
• Tide and currents data is immediately available
• Hydrographs would change because of storm event
• Use of remote sensing could better predict impacts, but may have limited use because of
storms
• Responders need to be aware of sources of information and models
• Need awareness of sensitive areas to prioritize response (in ACP and Environmental
Sensitivity Index (ESI) maps)
• Knowing cause of leak could help prevent future events
• Collecting data early is a challenge
5. What are the possible “unknowns”? How do we deal with uncertainty?
• What weather will do - Will it escalate?
• What other threats are escalating? Ex. Sewage treatment plant, neighboring industries
impacted by water damage
• Human casualties (separate from spill response)
• Other releases or problems because of storm, chemical releases that threaten responder
health
o Above ground storage tanks (other hazmat storage) could have high water and be
in jeopardy. Clay foundations could deteriorate because of standing water.
Historically, don’t have to detain water.
• Things change since plan is developed, and may not know what has changed until boots
are on the ground
6. What best practices would help us to respond better?
• Practice our plan
• Should port have a copy of response plans from vessels? Or have it publicly available?
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

(Debate over release to general public). USCG may already have this information.
Need to review preventative measure plans
Additional training (like this workshop), exercises/drills that engage larger community
Identify weaknesses in the plans
Increased communication could increase ability to utilize local resources
Why did this happen in the first place? Crew oversight, etc? Learn from mistake and
implement solutions.
Have a number for public to call or use photographs to report oil.
Use of social media by counties, use to advantage in response.
Incorporate public perception into messaging rather than combating it
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1:30 pm
Breakout Group Session III: Next Steps
Group A
What steps need to be taken to
improve preparation and
planning (as discussed in
breakout session II) to address
this kind of scenario?
Work within agencies/
organizations to address
problems internally (so don’t
repeat the same mistakes)

Who should be involved in
implementing the steps above
(e.g., partnerships, teams)?

Identify any roadblocks (e.g.,
funding)

• Individual
organizations/agencies
• Cross-agency leadership

Develop systems of knowledge
retention, archival and sharing
within agencies. So you can
benefit from existing programs.

• Individual employees
• Top down, leadership to
staff, corporate board

Build relationships with media
and journalists in fair weather

• Individual
agencies/organizations,
public affairs offices and
officials (PIOs)

• Personalities/egos
• Changes in leadership, turnover
• Administration changes and new
appointees
• Actually implementing changes
• Learning curves
• Status quo
• Ownership, territorial of
information
• Lack of information sharing
programs
• IT, security
• Lack of incentives to develop as
an agency
• Current policies too restrictive
• Miscommunications between
what is happening on ground
and PR person
• Unnecessarily defensive
• Complacency, lack of interest
• Short memories
• Funding
• Too much going on – info
overload

Have public forums (town hall
meetings, etc.) with
communities so that they know
what to expect when an
incident happens. Combats
misperceptions and lack of

• Spokespeople from individual
agencies – use agency
websites to inform
• LEPC – Superfund local
groups

Prioritize these steps and
estimate how long it would
take to implement the steps
(e.g., months, years,
continual)
Timeline: Months-Years, 5
years for a cultural shift
#4

Timeline: Up to 5 years
#5

Timeline: Quick or longterm. Ongoing process.
#6
Timeline: Months
#3

Group A. Page 5
information – set public at ease
early on.

• Media – radio and TV
networks

Increase frequency of exercises
that involve state/local
agencies in AL (perhaps
included in hurricane
preparedness agendas)

• Anyone who plans for these
events
• State
• USACE
• FEMA
• Army
• Other fed agencies with role
in response (USFWS)
• Municipal gov
• Public health agencies
U.S. Coast Guard
NGOs
States (ADEM)
Industry
Elected officials

Increase participation at
meetings and improve U.S.
Coast Guard Area Contingency
Plan (ACP) content

• Misconceptions
• Local/cultural norms and
standards (might accept lower
standards than other areas)
• Laws different from state to
state
• Agency polices
• Media
• Funding
• Time
• Lack of interest
• Lack of engagement –
complacency

• Public affairs (USCG, others?)
• Low frequency of ACP meetings
in Sector Mobile
• Low participation
• Old email lists

Timeline: 2 years to
implement, but can get
started immediately
#2

Timeline: Start publicizing
now. Month or less.
#1
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NOAA’s Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)
Natural Disaster Causing Technology Disasters in Mobile Bay Area
June 9, 10:00 AM
Breakout Group Session II: Planning/Preparedness
Group B
For the scenario, revisit themes of challenges and concerns from Breakout Session I when addressing the
following questions:
Special notes: I-10 would be open; Bankhead would be closed; causeway would be flooded; Bayway
would likely be open; oil would likely be mixing with flood waters in town (depends on winds); DHS,
FEMA, Red Cross needed for evacuations and temporary housing; spill would likely be on top of I-10
tunnel
1. What would likely work “as planned” (i.e., if there was only an oil spill)?
In terms of preparedness training; would area contingency plan still be valid? In immediate
aftermath, probably not.
• NCPRCPACP(FRP, VRP)GRP
• First week or two in reaction mode.
• Vessel and facility (FRP) CPs would be used.
• Same resources needed to respond to scenario, i.e., there would not be additional
resources available.
• Notification parts of plans would work well for city, facility, and vessel.
• County EMA plans address temporary housing; interface with FEMA; distribution of
ice/water; feeding people
• Wide-spread shoreline assessment needs  have resources
2. What would be the special challenges in responding to the oil spill as a result of the flooding and
storm-related issues?
• Mobilizing assets would be problem b/c access issues (flooding downtown), causeway
closed, tunnels open; would not be able to drive anything near spill
• Containment efforts would likely not work well
• Loss of power, boom resources, night time (can’t do much of anything) event  would all
be constraints
• Prioritization search and rescue before environmental response
• Establishing perimeter; securing the scene (harbor master, Captain of the Port [COTP],
local police, DOT)
• Displacement of people; do good job evacuating but no good plan for where they go and
for how long; special needs; pets
• Public health concerns
• What to do with oil, i.e., transfer?
• Would have oily debris vs usual storm debris
• Clean-up of fish kills
• Movement of oil; where oil goes will need clean-up, e.g., marsh, oyster reefs, etc.
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3. What is missing in the existing plans/preparedness? What could we add or change?
• Outreach to public; most plans do not have good outreach component
• Outreach not part of response
• Poor coordination
• Where to put displaced people
4. How well prepared are we to predict impacts and respond? What can we do to better predict
impacts?
• Predictions are really good for floods
• Vessel and facility plans do good job with spill predictions
• Geographic Response Plans (GRP) show sensitive areas, booming strategies, T&E species
locations, etc.
5. What are the possible “unknowns”? How do we deal with uncertainty?
• How much oil has leaked
• How much more oil could be released
• How many people are on tanker
• How to get people off tanker
• Cause of spill
• Why is vessel partially submerged  need to stop sinking and move vessel to prevent
further sinking
• Structural integrity of vessel
• Requires lots of phone calls (communication)
• Nationality of people on vessel; may not speak English
6. What best practices would help us to respond better?
• Exercises
• Training/workshops
• Professional outreach staff
• Detailed development and updating of GRPs fully developed GRP is nuts and bolts of
being prepared
• Tactical evaluations
• Pre-approved dispersant use
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Breakout Group Session III: Next Steps
Group B
What steps need to be
taken to improve
preparation and planning
(as discussed in breakout
session II) to address this
kind of scenario?

Who should be involved in
implementing the steps
above (e.g., partnerships,
teams)?

Benefits of
implementation

Identify any impediments
(e.g., funding)

Prioritize these steps and
estimate how long it
would take to implement
the steps (e.g., months,
years, continual)

1. Better equip and train
local PD for HAZMAT
response, e.g., mimic OSC
equipment; HAZWOPER
training  reach out to
USCG
3. More exercises,
particularly tabletop;
utilize GRPs, incorporate
online tools

Local PD; potentially USCG;
city council; EPA; NOAA;
EMA

Protecting responders;
improved
communication

Funding for training;
purchase and maintenance
of equipment; Initial 40 hr
training; requires annual
refresher

Once funding secured,
could implement within
months

All – state, federal, local,
county, NGOs, perhaps
some elected officials,
limited stakeholder
representation (i.e., vetted
POCs); MAWSS; NEPs, TNC
Unified Command –
Incident Management
Team (IMT); members that
make up Joint Information
Center (JIC) and
environmental unit team

Updated GRPs  living
document; increased
institutional knowledge

Scheduling; time
constraints

Continual, quarterly

Protecting responders,
improving safety for
stakeholders/public;
better use of responder
time  can focus on
other more important
needs
Provides
backup/alternate
location; safety for
people already in bldg

Political appointees;
increasing level of
bureaucracy  execution
at different levels

90 days if will was there

No clear impediments

90 days

2. Internal and external
process and procedure for
developing and releasing
press releases, and for
sharing info and data from
Unified Command
4. Equip NERRS with backup communication
equipment; prep bldg. for
use as Incident Command
Post; concept here is to
utilize existing structures
as back up facilities

MS DMR; NOAA; Jackson
County EOC
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NOAA’s Regional Preparedness Training (NRPT)
Natural Disaster Causing Technology Disasters in Mobile Bay Area
June 9, 10:00 AM
Breakout Group Session II: Planning/Preparedness
Group C
For the scenario, revisit themes of challenges and concerns from Breakout Session I when addressing the
following questions:
1. What would likely work “as planned” (i.e., if there was only an oil spill)?
Typical response responsibilities would kick in and include:
- Initiate search & rescue (if needed)
- Notify state, county, local agencies, etc.
- Shut down river traffic, businesses, and facilities
- Set up security zone on water & land
- Response from hazmat
- Mitigate and stabilize source
- Activate vessel response plan & response efforts (booms, etc.) and geographic response
plans
- Request NOAA trajectories
- Set up Incident Command Post
2. What would be the special challenges in responding to the oil spill as a result of the flooding and
storm-related issues?
-

Contaminated land (city, habitats, etc.) due to flooding
Movement of oil would be determined by conditions of storm
Negative public perception related to response efforts – people may not understand why
response efforts are on hold (due to storm)
Changes in response efforts (or be on hold) due to storm surge, wind, increased water
flow, debris, etc.
Oil would move more quickly; response efforts move more slowly because of weather
Impacted industries (down bay)
Reduced access (roads, tunnels, bridges, etc.)
Increased risk to personnel safety
Reduced personnel because of storm response efforts
Reduced/impacted communications (include interagency)
Restricted vessel movement/fewer events at local event facilities because of storm
Decontamination process of downtown (flooding, contamination, etc.)
Increased economic impacts (port, rail, etc. shut down due to flooding)
Localized event (storm)
Change in funding sources

3. What is missing in the existing plans/preparedness? What could we add or change?
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-

Process for security to protect the public due to flooding and contamination on land
Process for requesting and receiving help from other regions

4. How well prepared are we to predict impacts and respond? What can we do to better predict
impacts?
-

Current response plans are in place but resources may be limited
Response to storm could have efforts & resources already in place
Understanding of how water moves around the bay and city (sea level rise & storm surge
work) already exists and could be tied into response efforts

5. What are the possible “unknowns”? How do we deal with uncertainty?
-

Communicating/info sharing about response efforts to media and public – priorities,
process, etc.
Claims/compensation process for damage due to oiling on land (businesses, gov’t
buildings, etc.)
Availability of oil spill removal organizations (OSRO)
Logistics within port (receiving containerships, etc. & timing)
Contingency plans for companies impacted by port/rail being shut down
Availability of resources due to other competing events (disasters, Mardi Gras, sports)
Status of closed roads, etc.

6. What best practices would help us to respond better?
-

Continue to practice communicating with other agencies (public perception)
Continue to train (e.g., hazwoper) and have drills to be prepared
Pre-stage additional response resources
Share resources /existing MOUs
Establish more inspections & better maintenance of equipment (moorings, etc.)
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1:30 pm
Breakout Group Session III: Next Steps
Group C
What steps need to be taken
to improve preparation and
planning (as discussed in
breakout session II) to
address this kind of scenario?

Who should be involved in
implementing the steps
above (e.g., partnerships,
teams)?

Get politicians to participate in
training exercises

Training host, state on-scene
coordinator, NEP (gov’t
network committee), local
USCG

PROBABLY WON’T HAPPEN
– Too busy, scheduling,
other priorities, high
turnover, perceived as
irrelevant

Assist with decisionmaking outcome,
funding, assist with reelection, piggyback on
other relevant event,
media coverage

Get environmental NGOs to
participate in training
exercises

Training host, NGOs (e.g.,
Mobile BayKeeper, AL Coastal
Foundation, Africatown
community group),
emergency responders

Keeping NGOs on task and
focused, NGO lack of trust
and ownership,
perceptions, focused on
advocacy topic, priorities
misunderstood (on both
sides)

See bigger picture and
greater understanding of
process and challenges,
improve media/public
perception, more
incentive to keep story in
context

Get media to participate in
training exercises

Training host, impartial media
experts (e.g., COMPASS), port
& agency public information
officers/pr/media contact,
media, governor’s office,
contact that knows media

Bias, lack of relationships,
lack of trust, turnover,
secondary job for some
public information officers

Education, relationship
building, more incentive
for factual reporting and
in correct context,
improved messaging

Identify any impediments
(e.g., funding)

Identify
benefits/outcomes

Prioritize these steps and
estimate how long it
would take to implement
the steps (e.g., months,
years, continual)

#6 – continual
6, 5, 6, 4, 5, 6, 6 = 38

#5 – annual or as available
3, 2, 5, 5, 4, 4, 5 = 28

#2 – annual or as available
5, 1, 2, 3, 1, 5, 2 = 18
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What steps need to be taken
to improve preparation and
planning (as discussed in
breakout session II) to
address this kind of scenario?

Who should be involved in
implementing the steps
above (e.g., partnerships,
teams)?

Identify any impediments
(e.g., funding)

Identify
benefits/outcomes

Prioritize these steps and
estimate how long it
would take to implement
the steps (e.g., months,
years, continual)

Encourage participation at
Area Committee
meeting/training events (i.e.,
spill drills)

Training host, Sea Grant, NEP,
NERRs, NGOs, USCG, FOSC,
EPA, state and local agencies

Scheduling conflicts, time
commitment,
complacency, turnover,
visibility, people don’t
know about the meeting

Building understanding,
face-to-face time,
relationships,
understanding roles and
responsibilities ,
identifying go-to people,
updating response plans,
understanding
jurisdictions, dependable
findings

Outreach to businesses, civic
and local groups, media

NOAA DRC, Chamber of
commerce, Downtown
Alliance, civic organizations,
Leadership Mobile, Partners in
Environmental Progress, Sea
Grant

Scheduling conflicts, time
commitment, priorities,
return on investment,
ignorance

Better understanding of
how response works,
#3 – monthly/continual
roles and responsibilities,
oil behavior, etc.
4, 3, 3, 6, 3, 2, 3 = 24
(modeled after Science of
Spills), funding

Finding ways to maintain
certification (e.g., hazwoper)

NOAA DRC, state and local
agencies, NERRs, cooperative
extension, emergency mgmt
agency, Chevron, NGOs,
businesses, etc.

Scheduling conflicts, time
commitment, priorities,
return on investment,
perceived need, incentive

Increased safety, meets a
job requirement

#1 – continual
1, 4, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1 = 11

#4 – annual or as available
2, 6, 4, 2, 6, 3, 4 = 27

